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easily brought on; the faculties are otherwise entire, and the bodily
strength considerable. This state of a party's mind at a great
age (93 or 94) was exhibited in a remarkable manner in a case
from Scotland, which went to the House of Lords ('aiYs vs.

Marienski)."
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JAMES W. BALDWIN Vs. OSCAR C. HALE.
A discharge under the insolvent laws of one state will not discharg a .lobt to a
citizen of another state, unless the latter has voluntarily become a puyty to the
proceedings, and thus given the court jurisdiction.
Therefore where A., being a citizen of Massachusetts, made a nate psay.&ble in
Boston, and endorsed it to B., a citizen of Vermont, and aftervurds, upon dus
proceedings in Massachusetts, obtained a certificate of dischasgs from his debtl.
it was held that the discharge was not a good defence to an * 'ton by B. ou iho
note, in the Federal courts.
cribner vs. Fisher, 2 Gray 43, dissented from.

.A. Brooks, for plaintiff in error.

Henry C. Hutchins. for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
"Court of the
CLIFFORD, J.-This is a writ of error to the &.ie,.it
United States for the district of Massaphusetts. Parties submitted the case in the court below upon un agreed "statement of
facts, and the same'is still a part of the record. Judgment was
entered for the plaintiff, and the defenaant sued out this writ of
error. Plaintiff was and ever since has been a citizen of Vermont,
and the defendant was and still is a citizen of Massachusetts, where
the suit was brought. Action was assumpsit, and the declaration
was drawn upon the following promissory note:
"Boston, Feb. 21, 1854. 82000. Six months after date I
promise to pay to the order of myself two thousand dollars, pay
able at Boston, value received."
And the same was duly indorsed by the defendant to the order
of the plaintiff.
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After the date of the note and before the commencement of the
suit, the defendant, upon due proceedings in the Insolvent Court of
Massachusetts, obtained a certificate of discharge from his debts,
and the only question in the case is whether that certificate of discharge is a bar to the present suit. Contract was made in Boston
and was to be performed at the place where it was made, and upon
that ground it is contended by the defendant that the certificate
of discharge is a complete bar to the action. But the case shows
that the plaintiff was a citizen of Vermont, and inasmuch as he
did not prove his debt against the defendant's estate in insolvency,,
nor in any manner become a party to those proceedings, he insists
that the certificate of discharge is a matter inter alios, and wholly
insufficient to support the defence.
Adopting the views of the court in Scribner et al. vs. Fisher, 2
Gray 43, the defendant concedes that the law is so, as between
citizens of different states, except in cases where it appears by theterms of the contract that it was made and must be performed in
the state enacting such insolvent law. Where the contract was
made and is by its terms to be performed in the state in which the
certificate of discharge was obtained, the argument is that the
discharge is entirely consistent with the contract, and that the
certificate operates as a bar to the right of recovery, everywhere,
irrespective of the citizenship of the promissee. Plaintiff admits
that a majority of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the
case referred to, attempted to maintain that distinction, but he
insists that it is without any foundation in principle, and that the
decisions of this court in analogous cases are directly the other
way.
Controversies involving the constitutional effect and operation
of state insolvent laws have frequently been under consideration
in this court, and unless it be claimed that constitutional questions
must always remain open, it must be conceded, we think, that
there are some things connected with the general subject that
ought to be regarded as settled and for ever closed.
State legislatures have authority to pass a bankrupt or insolvent
law, provided there be no act of Congress in force establishing a
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uniform system of bankruptcy, conflicting with such law; and provided the law itself be so framed that it does not impair the obligation of contracts. Such was the decision of this court in
Sturgis vs. 0rowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, and the authority of that
decision lias never been successfully questioned. Suit was brought
in that case against the defendant as the maker of two promissory
notes. They were both dated at New York, on the 22d day of
March 1811, and the defendant pleaded his discharge under an
act for the benefit of insolvent debtors and their creditors, passed
by the legislature of New York subsequently to the date of
the notes in controversy. Contracts in that case, it will be
observed, were made prior to the passage of the law, and the court
held, for that reason, that the law, or that feature of it, was
unconstitutional and void, as impairing the obligation of contracts
within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.
Suggestion is made that the ruling of the court in the case of
McMillan vs. Mceill, 4 Wheat. 209, decided at the same term,
asserts a different doctrine, but we think not, if the facts of the
case are properly understood.
Recurring to the statement of the case, it appears that the contract was made in Charleston, in the state of South Carolina, and
it is true that both parties resided there at the time the contract
was made, but the defendant subsequently removed to New
Orleans, in the state of Louisiana, and it was in the latter state
where he obtained the certificate of discharge from his debts. He
was also one of a firm doing business in Liverpool, and a commission of bankruptcy had been issued there, both against him and
his partner, and they respectively obtained certificates of discharge. Suit was brought in the District Court for the district. of
Louisiana, and the defendant pleaded those certificates of discharge in bar of the action, and the plaintiff demurred to the plea.
Under that state of the case and of the pleadings the court held
that the certificate of discharge, obtained in the state of Louisiana,
was no defence to the suit, and very properly remarked that the
circumstance that the state law was passed before the debt was
contracted made no difference in the application of the principle.
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Bearing in mind that the plaintiff was a citizen of South Carolina,
and that the contract was made there, it is obvious that the remark
of the court is entirely consistent with the decision in the former
case.
Secondly, the court also held that a discharge under a foreign
bankrupt law was no bar to an action in the courts of the United
States, on a contract made in this country. Speaking of that case,
Mr. Justice JOHNSON afterwards remarked that it decided nothing
more than that insolvent laws have no extraterritorial operation
upon the contracts of other states, and that the anterior or posterior
character of the law with reference to the date of the contract
makes no difference in the application of that principle. Eight
years later the question, in all its phases, was again presented to
this court, in the case of Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, and
was very fully examined.
Three principal points were ruled by the court. First, the
court held that the power of Congress to establish uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States did not
exclude the right of the states to legislate on the same subject,
except when the power had actually been exercised by Congress,
and the state laws conflicted with those of Congress. Secondly,
that a bankrupt -or insolvent law of any state which discharges
both the person of the debtor and his future acquisitions of
property, was not a law impairing the obligation of contracts so
far as respects debts contracted subsequent to the passage of such
law. Thirdly, but that a certificate of discharge under such a law
cAnnot be pleaded in bar of an action brought by a citizen of
another state in the courts of the United States or of any other state
than that where the discharge was obtained. Much diversity of
opinion, it must be admitted, existed among the members of the
court on that occasion, but it is clear that the conclusions to which
the majority came were in precise accordance with what had been
substantially determined in the two earlier cases to which reference
has been made. Misapprehension existed, it seems, for a time,
whether the second opinion delivered by Mr. Justice JOHNSON in
that case was, in point of fact, the opinion of a majority of the
VOL. XII.-O0
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court, but it is difficult to see any ground for any such d6ubt.
Referring to the opinion it will be seen that he states explicitly
that he is instructed to dispose of the cause, and he goes on to
explain that the majority on the occasion is not the same as that
which determined the general question previously considered.
Ample authority exists for regarding that opinion as the opinion
of the court, independently of what appears in the published
report of the case. When the subsequent case of Boyle vs.
Zacharie et al., 6 Pet. 348, was first called for argument, inquiry
was made of the court whether the opinion in question was
adopted by the other judges who concurred in the judgment of the
court. To which MARSHALL, C. J., replied, that the judges who
were in the minority of the court upon the general question concurred in that opinion, and that whatever principles were established in that opinion were to be considered no longer open for
controversy, but the settled law of the court. Judge STORY
delivered the unanimous opinion of the court in that case during
the same session, and in the course of the opinion he repeated the
explanations previously given by the Chief Justice: Boyle vs.
Zacharie et al., 6 Pet. 643. Explanations to the same effect were
also made by the present Chief Justice in the case of Cook vs.
Moffat et al., 5 How. 310, which had been ruled by him at the
circuit. He had ruled the case in the court below in obedience to
what he understood to be the settled doctrine of the court, and a
majority of the court affirmed the judgment. Acquiescing in that
judgment as a correct exposition of the law of the court, he, nevertheless, thought it proper to restate the individual opinion which
he entertained upon the subject, but before doing so he gave a
clear and satisfactory exposition of what had previously been
decided by the court. Those remarks confirm what had at a much
earlier period been fully explained by the former Chief Justice
and his learned associate. Taken together, these several explana"tionsought to be regarded as final and conclusive. Assuming that
to be so, then, it was settled by this court, in that case-1. That
the power given to the United States to pass bankrupt laws is not
exclusive. 2. That the fair and ordinary exercise of that power
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by the states does not necessarily involve a violation of the obligation of contracts, multo fortiori of posterior contracts. 8. But
when in the exercise of that power the states pass beyond their
own limits and the rights of their own citizens, and act upon the
rights of citizens of other states, there arises a conflict of sovereign
power and a collision with the judicial powers' granted to the
United States, which renders the exercise of such a power incompatible with the rights of other states, and with the Constitution of
the United States. Saunders, a citizen of Kentucky, brought suit
in that case against Ogden, who was a citizen of Louisiana at the
time the suit was brought. Plaintiff declared upon certain bills of
exchange drawn by one Jordan, at Lexington, in the state of
Kentucky, upon Ogden, the defendant, in the city of New, York,
where he then resided. He was then a citizen of the state of New
York, and the case shows that he accepted the bills of exchange as
the city of New York, and that they were subsequently protested
for non-payment.

Defendant pleaded his discharge under the Insolvent Law of New
York5 passed prior to the date of the contract. Evidently, therefore, the question presented was, whether a discharge of a debtor
under a state insolvent law was valid as against a creditor or
citizen of another- state, who had not subjected himself to the state
laws otherwise than by the origin of the contract, and the decision
in express terms was, that such a proceeding was " incompetent to
discharge a debt due a citizen of another state." Whenever the
question has been presented to this court since that opinion was
pionounced, the answer has uniformly been that the question
depended upon citizenship. Such were the views of the court in
Suydam et al. vs. Broadnax et al., 14 Pet. 75, where it was
expressly held that a certificate of discharge cannot be pleaded in
bar of an action brought by a citizen of another state in the courts
of the United States, or of any other state than that where the discharge was obtained. Undoubtedly a state may pass a bankrupt
or insolvent law under the conditions before mentioned, and such
a law is operative and binding upon the citizens of the state; but
we repeat what the court said in Cook vs. MZloffatt et al., 5 How.
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308, that such laws " can have no effect on contracts made before
their enactment, or beyond their territory." Judge STORY says,
in the case of Springer vs. Foster et al., 2 Story C. C. 387, that
the settled doctrine of the Supreme Court is, that no state insolvent laws can discharge the obligation of any contract made in the
state except such contracts as are made between citizens of that
state. He refers to the case of Ogden vs. Saunders to support the
proposition, and remarks, without qualification, that the doctrine
of that case was subsequently affirmed in Boyle vs. Zacharie,where
there was no division of opinion. In the last-mentioned case he
gave the opinion of the court, and he there expressed substantially
the same views. Confirmation of the fact that such was his
opinion may be found both in his Commentaries on the Constitution and in his treatise entitled Conflict of Laws. His view as to
the result of the various decisions of this court is, that, they
etablish the following propositions :-1. That state insolvent laws
may apply to all contracts within the state- between citizens of the
state. 2. That they do not apply to contracts made within the
state between a citizen of the state and a citizen, of another state.
8. That they do not apply to contracts not made within the state:
2 Story on Const., sec. 1390 (3d edition), p. 281 ; Story on Confl.
L., sec. 341, p. 573.
Chancellor KENT also says that the discharge under a state law
is not effectual as against a citizen of another state who did not
make himself a party to the proceedings under the law: 2 Kent
Com. (9th ed.), p. 503. All of the state courts, or nearly all.
except the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, have adopted the same
view of the subject, and that court has recently held that a certificate of discharge in insolvency is no bar'to an action by a foreign
corporation against the payee of a note, who indorsed it to the
corporation in blank before its maturity, although the note itself
was executed and made payable in that state by a citizen of the
state. Repeated decisions have been made in that court which
seem to support the same doctrine: Savoy vs. Marsh, 10 Met
594; Braynard vs. Marshall, 8 Pick. 196. But a majority of
court held, in Seribner et al. vs. Fisher, 2 Gray 43, that if the con-
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tract was to be performed. in the state where the discharge was
obtained, it was a good defence to an action on -the contract,
although the plaintiff was a citizen of another state and had not in
any manner become a party to the proceedings. Irrespective of
authority it would be difficult if not impossible to sanction that
doctrine. Insolvent systems of every kind partake of the character of a judicial investigation. Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified. Common justice
requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or property
without notice and an opportunity to make his defence: Nations
et al. vs. Johnson et al., 24 How. 203; Boswell's -Lessee vs. Otis
et al., 9 How. 350; Oakley vs. Aspinwall, 4 Comst. 513.
Regarded merely in the light of principle, therefore, the rule is
one which could hardly be defended, as it is quite evident that the
courts of one state would have no power to require the citizens of
other states to become parties to any such proceeding : Suydam
et al. vs. Broadnax et al., 14 Pet. 175. But it is unnecessary to
pursue the inquiry, as the decisions of this court are directly the
other way; and so are most of the decisions of the state courts.
Donnelly vs. Corbell, 3 Seld. 500 ; Poe vs. Duck, 5 Mi. 1 ; AnderD
son vs. Whaler, 25 Conn. 607 ; Fishervs. Bugbee et al., 48 Me. 9 ;
Demerrit vs. Exchange Bank, 10 Law Rep. 606; Woodhull vs.
Wagner, Bald. C. C. 300.
Insolvent laws of one state cannot discharge the contracts of
citizens of other states, because they have no extraterritorial
operation, and consequently the tribunal sitting under them, unless
in cases where a citizen of such other state voluntarily becomes a
party to the proceeding, has no jurisdiction in the case. Legal
notice cannot be given, and consequently there can be no obligation to appear, and of course there can be no legal default. The
judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed with costs.
The foregoing opinion cannot fail to
be of interest to the profession, as instances are very common where bills
and notes are made payable, at commercial points, beyond the limits of the

state where given; and it must be an
important consideration whether such
securities can be released under the insolvent laws of the states where payabile.
There is do doubt that any act of the

BALDWIN vs. HALE.
debtor in pais, which is claimed to
operate as payment, performance, or in
discharge of a contract, in any manner,
must be judged of by the law of the
place of the performance of the contract.
Hence, if the question is one of performance. tender, payment, release, it is
determined by the law of the place
where the contract requires these incidents to be performed. Some of these
incidents may be affected by the law of
the forum, being connected with the
remedy, as tender, which is required by
the English law when made in coin to be
brought into court, that the creditor
may have the opportunity of accepting
it at any time when he will.
But a, discharge of the debtor, under
insolvent or bankrupt laws, is not of the
character ofpayment or performance. It
is not because the debtor has lost his
!roperty, or become insolvent, that he is
released from his obligation, but because
he has obtained a formal release. The
validity of the discharge depends upon
that of the proceedings wherein it was
obtained. And this, being of a judicial
character, must depend upon the law
under which the tribunal acted, and the
extent of the jurisdiction of such tribunal.
As to state insolvent laws, no principle is more familiar than that their
effect is limited to the state of their
creation. That is true of all laws, but
especially of state insolvent laws. The
contrast between state insolvent laws
and a. general bankrupt law of the

United States consists chiefly in this:
that one is confined to the particular
state, and the other operates throughout
the nation. And one residing without
the state, having a claim against the
debtor who has obtained his discharge
under the insolvent laws of the state,
stands in the same relation to the dis.
charge that a foreign resident does to a
discharge obtained under a general
bankrupt law.
In addition to this, the discharge in
insolvency or bankruptcy depends upon
certain judicial proceedings, and is of
the nature of a judgment or decree. Its
force must, therefore, of necessity,
depend upon the court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the
parties. But the court of insolvency in
a state can have no jurisdiction of the
subject-matter of a contract, which
attends the person of the creditor, unless
that creditor submits it to the court and
claims a dividend. Otherwise the case
is the same as a personal action where
the debtor is not within the jurisdiction
and does not appear in the suit. Judgments rendered in such cases are absolute nullities : Bissell vs. Briggs, 9
Mass. R. 454; Thurber vs. Blackbourne,
1 New H. R. 242; Hall -vs. Williams, 6
Pick. 244; Webster vs. Reed, 11 How.
U. S. R. 456; D'Arcy vs. Ketchum, Id
165. It seems to us the decision in this
case is the only one that could be made
to stand with the former decisions of
the court.
LP.B.
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Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
DARIUS NORRIS VS. REBECCA DONIPHAN.
The Act of Congress, approved July 17th 1862, entitled "An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property
of rebels, and for other purposes," after declaring that all the estate and property,
money, stocks, and credits, of certain officers of the so-called Confederate States,
and of certain other persons therein mentioned, shall be seized and confiscated,
by proneedings in rem in the Federal courts, declares that "it shall be a sufficient bar to any suit brought by such person for the possession or the use of
such property, or any of it, to allege and prove that he is one of the persons
described in this section." Hdd, first, that the last-named provision applies
to suits for the recovery of debts; secondly, that it was designed to apply to
suits in the state as well as the Federal courts.
If the provisions of the act, concerning the seizure and confiscation of such property, are unconstitutional and void, it seems clear that Congress has no power
to prohibit the state courts from giving to the owners the relief to which they
are entitled by the laws of the states.
The forfeitures or confiscations proposed by this act are to be effected on account
of offences which the owner may commit, without reference to the use of his
property; hence, the doctrine that property which is used to violate a blockade,
or revenue laws, may be forfeited by proceedings in rem, without conviction of
the owner, has no application to this case.
That clause of thec Constitution which authorizes Congress "to declare war, grant.
letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and
water," has no bearing on this question. It relates only to wars with foreign
nation. (The Brilliant vs. United State8.)
The usage of nations, if applicable to the case, does not sanction the confiscation
of property here belonging to rebels, and debts owing to them before the commencement of hostilities.
A sovereign, engaged in a public war, may disregard the usage of nations and
establish a different rule toward the enemy, which shall bind those within his
£urisdic iun.
The existence of a public war gives to Congress the power, as a belligerent right,
to confiscate enemies' property on land, though such is not the usage of nations.
,.'ongress possessed the power to pass the act in question, if the existence of civil
war gives to the Government all the belligerent rights against rebellious citizens
whic.h it possesses against alien enemies during a public war.
r'ke authority to make war for the suppression of rebellion is derived from those
clauses of the Constitution which declare that "the President shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed," and that Congress shall have power "to
provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions."
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The right given by the Constitution to make war upon rebels, gives the power to
perform acts of war, and no other power whatever.
The seizure and confiscation of enemies' property on land are not acts of war.
(Brown vs. United States, 8 Crouch.)
the Constitution does not prohibit the confiscation of the property of alien enemies. The protection received by aliens residing abroad, with reference to
their property here, is due, not to the Constitution, but to international comity,
which may be suspended during war. But the Constitution, and not the law of
nations, governs the relations between the Government and citizens of the
United States. They, though traitors, must be dealt with according to the Constitution.
The act under consideration is unconstitutional, because it attempts to authorize
the confiscation of the property of citizens, as a punishment for treason and
other crimes, without due process of law, by proceedings in rem in any district
in which the property may be, without presentment or indictment by a grand
:ury, without arrest or summons of the owner, and upon such evidence of ms
guilt as would be sufficient proof of any fact in admiralty or revenue cases.
(Con., art. 3, sec. 2, sub. 3, and sec. 3 sub. 1; 5th and 6th amendment.)
Suit upon a note. The answer avers that when the rebellion commenced the
plaintiff resided in Missouri, became a Secessionist, actually joined the Confederate government, and moved to Arkansas, where she could better have its
protection, and where she has continued to this time to give aid and comfort
to the rebellion by her means and money: held, upon demurrer, that, if the
statements of the answer are true, the plaintiff cannot, upon common law principles, maintain an action here during the war; and her petition should be diw.
missed without prejudice.

T. ..Hord and James Harlan, for appellant.
Harrison Taylor, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BULLITT, J.-In September 1862, the appellee, Rebecca Doniphan, by her attorney, filed a petition seeking to recover from the
appellant $5000 due upon his note to Jier, executed in the year
1860.
The appellant filed an answer, alleging that when the present
rebellion commenced, the said Rebecca resided in the state of
Missouri, and became a Secessionist, and actually joined the Confederate government, and moved to the state of Arkansas, where
she could better have the protection thereof, and where she has
continued to this time to assist and give aid and comfort to the
rebellion by her means and money; that, on the 22d day of July

-NORRIS vs. DONIPHAN.

1862, the President of the United States issued his proclamation,
as required by the 6th section of the Act of Congress, approved
July 17th 1862, and entitled "An act to suppress insurrection: to
punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property
of rebels, and for other purposes ;" and that the said Rebecca has
not returned to, her allegiance to the United -States, but still
remains in Arkansas, assisting the rebellion, and giving aid and
comfort to the rebels, by giving to them money to carry on the said
rebellion; and he pleaded the Act of Congress in bar, and prayed
that the petition might be dismissed.
A demurrer to the answer was sustained, and a judgment rendered against the defendant, to reverse which he prosecutes this
appeal.
The above-mentioned Act of Congress declares that any person
who shall commit treason shall be punished by death and by the
liberation of his slaves, or by fine and imprisonment and the
liberation of his slaves, and that any person who shall incite or
engage in any rebellion or insurrection, or give aid and comfort
thereto, shall be punished by imprisonment, or by a fine and
the liberation of his slaves, or by both of said punishments, at the
discretion of the court; and then, after directing the President to
seize all the property of certain officers, civil and military, of
the so-called Confederate States of America, and of certain
other persons therein mentioned, and to use the same and the proceeds thereof for the support of the army of the United States,
declares as follows:
"SEc. 6. And be itfurtherenacted, That if any person within any
state or territory of the United States, other than those named as
aforesaid, after the passage of this act, being engaged in armed
rebellion against the government of the United States, or aiding or
abetting such rebellion, shall not, within sixty days after public warning and proclamation duly given and made by the President of the
United States, cease to aid, countenance, and abet such rebellion,
and return to his allegiance to the United States, all the estate and
property, money, stocks, and credits of such person shall be liable
to seizure as aforesaid; and it shall be the duty of the President
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to seize and use them as aforesaid, or the proceeds thereof; and
all sales, transfers, or conveyances of any such property, after the
expiration 'of the said sixty days from the date of such warning
and proclamation, shall be null and void; and it shall be a sufficient bar to any suit brought by such person for the possession
or the use of such property or any of it, to allege and prove that
he is one of the persons described in this section."
The 7th section authorizes proceedings in rem, in the District
Courts of the United States, to be instituted in any district in
which the property or any part thereof may be found, or into which
the same, if movable, may at first be brought, which shall conform as nearly as may be to proceedings in admiralty or revenue
cases, "to secure the condemnation and sale of any of such
property, after the same shall have been seized, so .that it may- be
made available for the purposes aforesaid."
By a joint resolution adopted July 17th 1862, it was declared
ihat no '"punishment or proceedings under said act shall be construed to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond
his natural life."
The act does not authorize the state courts to condemn such
property. It can only be condemned by the District Courts of the
United States. The only provision of the act that can possibly be
regarded as designed to control the action of the state courts, with
reference to the proceedings which it authorizes, isthat which
declares that "it shall be a sufficient bar ta any suit brought by
such person for the possession or the use of such property, or any
of it, to allege and prove that he is one of the persons described
in this section."
Does this provision apply to suits for the recovery of debts?
The 6th section declares that "all the estate and property,
moneys, stocks, and credits" of the persons therein described shall
be seized, &c.; and *that all sales, transfers, or conveyances "1of
any such property" shall be void, and that it shall be a sufficient.
bar to any suit for the possession or use "of any such property,"
to allege, &c. ; and the 7th section authcrizes the proceedings
before mentioned to secure the condemnation and sale "of any of
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such property." It seems clear that the words "such property"
were designed to embrace all the property first mentioned, namely:
"All the estate and property, moneys, stocks, and credits" of the
persons described in the act.
But does the provision concerning pleas in bar relate to the
Btate courts? If it does, and is valid, a state court may render a
judgment in bar of an action, upon the ground that the plaintiff
is a rebel; and the District Court, having jurisdiction over the
subject, may afterwards refuse to confiscate the property, upon
the ground that he is not a rebel.
It seems unreasonable to suppose that Congress intended to
make a rule capable of producing such a result. But it seems
equally extraordinary that Congress should have contemplated
other results of a similar character that were evidently aimed at
by the act in question, which undertakes to authorize the seizure
by the President and condemnation by a district judge, of the
property of any citizen whom those officers may consider guilty
of either of the offences mentioned in the act, without a trial by
jury, or, upon a trial by jury in any district in which any of the
property may be found, or into which, if movable, it may first be
brought, whilst, by the same act, for the same offence, the same
citizen is made amenable to a criminal prosecution, which, after
his property has been confiscated, and the proceeds expended by
the President, may result in his aquittal by a jury in the state and
district in which the offence may be alleged to have been committed.
, The provision prohibiting the rendition of judgments in favor
of persons described in the act, was evidently made chiefly for the
purpose of facilitating the seizure and confiscation of their property
by the agents and courts of the United States. The state courts,
by rendering judgments in favor of such persons, might seriously
impede the efforts of those agents and courts to seize and confiscate such property. In view of these facts, and of the comprehensive language of the provision, our opinion is, that it was
designed to apply to suits in the state as well as the Federal
courts.

NORRIS vs. DONIPHAN.

Although Congress could not have required the state courts to
take jurisdiction over proceedings for the confiscation of such
property, if it had attempted to do so, yet it ought, perhaps,
to be conceded, and will be conceded for the purposes of this case,
that, if Congress has the power to authorize the seizure and confiscation of the property of the rebels in the manner contemplated
by this act, it has also the incidental power to prohibit the recovery
of such property, by such persons, in the state courts. But, on
the other hand, if the provisions of the act, concerning the seizure
and confiscation of such property, are unconstitutional and void,
leaving the rights of the owners unimpaired and indefeasible, it
seems clear that Congress has no power to prohibit the state
courts from giving to them the relief to which they are entitled
under the laws of the states.
Thus the question arises, whether the provisions of the act,
authorizing the seizure and confiscation of the property of rebels,
ire valid, or unconstitutional and void.
The cases in which it has been held, that property with which
the owner has attempted to violate a blockade, or revenue laws,
may be forfeited by a proceeding in rem, without a conviction of
the owner, have no bearing on this question. Those cases rest
upon the ground that "the thing is primarily the offender, or
rather the offence is primarily attached to the thing." Per STORY,
J., in The Palmyra, 12 Wheaton 14. But the forfeitures, or confiscations, contemplated by the statute under consideration, are to
be effected, not on account of any use of the property by its owner,
but on account of offences which the owner may commit without
reference to his property.
Counsel seek to sustain the power of Congress thus to punish
rebels, upon several grounds:
1. It is contended that this power can be exercised under that
clause of the constitution which authorizes Congress "to declare
war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning capturea on land and water." That clause, however, has
no bearing on this question, because it relates only to wars with
foreign nations, as was recently decided by the Supreme Court of
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the United States, in the cases of The Brilliant, ic., vs. United
States, 2 Am. Law Register 834.
2. It is contended that the right to confiscate the property of
rebels is conferred on the government of the United States by the
law of nations.
The usage of nations, if applicable to the case, does not sustain
this effort to confiscate property here belonging to rebels, and
debts owing to them, before the commencement of hostilities ; for
it is settled that the modern usage of nations does not sanction
such confiscation of the property of even alien enemies : Bell vs.
Chapman, 10 John. 183; Hutchinson vs. Brock, 11 Mass. 119;
Brown vs. United States, 8 Cranch 110; 1 Kent's Com. 92.
It must be conceded, however, that the courts of a sovereign,
engaged in war, cannot compel him to observe the usage of nations,
nor treat as void any act of his because it violates that usage. The
law of nations has no obligatory force upon him in dealing with
his subjects. He may disregard it and establish a different rule ;
and if he does so, those within his jurisdiction must observe the
rule so established, however it may conflict with the usage of
nations. In the absence of any positive law to the contrary, the
usage of nations may furnish a rule for the guidance of courts of
justice; but they cannot be governed by it in the presence of a
positive conflicting law made by a sovereign who may choose to
disregard it. This is all that Chief Justice MARSHALL meant
when he spoke of "the modern usage of nations which has become
law" United States vs. Percheman, 7 Peters 86 ; as is shown by
his opinion in the case of Brown vs. United States, 8 Cranch 110,
in which he used this language:
"This usage [of nations] is a guide which the sovereign follows
or abandons at his will. The rule, like other rules of morality,
of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of
the sovereign; and although it cannot be disregarded by him
without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded. * * * Respecting
the power of the government [to confiscate the property of alien
enemies on land] no doubt is entertained. That [public] war
gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and con-
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fiscate the property of the enemy wherever found, is conceded.
The mitigations of this rigid rule, which the humane and wise
policy of modern times has introduced into practice, will more or
less affect- the exercise of this right, but cannot impair the right
itself. That remains undiminished, and when the sovereign
authority shall choose to bring it into operation, the judicial
department must give effect to its will. But until that will shall
be expressed, no power of condemnation can exist in the court."
It seems, therefore, that the act of a sovereign, exercising
belligerent rights against a separate nation, however grossly it
may violate the usage of nations, gives the law by which, at least,
all courts and persons within his jurisdiction must be governed.
And, as the existence of a public war gives to Congress the power,
as a belligerent right, to confiscate enemy's property on land,
though such is not the usage of nations, it follows that Congress
possesses the power to pass the act under consideration, if the
existence of civil war gives to the government all the belligerent
rights against its rebellious citizens, which it possesses against
alien enemies during a public war.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the President " shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and
that Congress shall have power "to provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections,
and repel invasions." It will be conceded, for the purposes of
this case, not only that these provisions authorize the government
to make war for the suppression of an insurrection, which takes
the shape of war, as the present one has done, but that the army
and navy may lawfully prosecute the war as if it were a war with
alien enemies, and according to the usages of public wars. Does
it necessarily follow that the rebels may lawfully be treated as
alien enemies by all the departments of the government ? We
believe not.
The right, given by the Constitution, to make war upon rebels,
gives the power to perform acts of war, and gives no other power
whatever.
Civil wars being, in many respects, of the same nature as public
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wars, theright to treat armed rebels, in many respects, as if they
were alien enemies, necessarily results from the power to make
.
,
war upon them.
The facts, that prisoners are exchanged, that flags of truce
are respected by the opposing forces, that armed rebels may
be lawfully slain in battle, that their arms, ammunition, and stores
may be lawfully taken and used or destroyed, that articles, contra
band of war, being sent to them, may be lawfully confiscated, that
their ports may be lawfully blockaded, and that their property on
the high seas may be lawfully seized as.prize of war; these facts
prove that civil wars are, in many respects," the same as wars
between separate nations; and they prove nothing more.', These
being acts of war, the right to perform them necessarily results
from the power to make war.
But the fact that the army may fight rebels as- if they were
alien enemies, does not prove that Congress can legislate ,against
.
them as if they were alien enemies.
The courts have as much right to treat them as alien enemies
by refusing to try them for treason, as Congress has to treat them
as alien enemies by confiscating their property.
Circumstances may arise which would authorize the army to
destroy the dwelling-house of a rebel. Can Congress,. for that
reason, confiscate all the dwelling-houses of rebels ? If so, it can,
for the same reason, confiscate the dwelling-houses of friendly
citizens in states adhering to the Union; for the army may destroy
the latter, as well as the former, to save itself from destruction. ,
-In the case of T]he Amy Warwick, in the United States District Court for the district of Massachusetts, Judge SPRAGUE,
after stating that "in war each belligerent may seize and confiscate all the property of the enemy wherever found," and that
"this right extends to the property of all persons residing in the
enemy's country," expressed the opinion that, in this civil war,
"the United States, as a nation, have full and complete belligerent
rights, which are in nodegree impaired by the fact that their enemies owe allegiance, and have superadded the guilt of treason tc
that of an unjust war." We are not prepared to admit that Con-
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gress has the power to confiscate the property of persons residing
in the rebellious states, who have given no aid to the rebellion,
or who have given it no aid except upon compulsion, and who
have given all the aid they could to the Government of the United
States, whilst receiving from it none of the protection to which
they were entitled. The conclusion arrived at by Judge SPRAGUE,
if correct, proves that. Congress has the power to, confiscate the
property of such persons. And we do not perceive how that conclusion can be avoided, if the law of nations governs this controversy, or if, in other words, the Government of the United States
possesses, in this contest, all the rights of a belligerent engaged
in a public war.
If the law of nations governs the relations of the parties to
this contest, it gives to each of them precisely the same rights.
If it gives to the Federal Government the right, as a belligerent, to confiscate real estate and personal property on land
belonging to rebels, it gives to the Confederate Government the
right, as a belligerent, to confiscate like property of citizens
adhering to the Federal Government; and confiscation sales
made by the Confederate authorities would pass valid titles, which
could not be annulled by the courts of the United States, after
the suppression of the rebellion. This is unquestionable, if the
relations of the parties to this contest are governed by the law
of nations.
But, to meet this difficulty, it is contended that the rebels are,
in legal contemplation, and may lawfully be treated as, at the
same time, alien enemies and rebellious citizens, and that the
Government has against them, at one and the same time, all the
rights conferred upon it by the Constitution over citizens of the
United States, and all the rights conferred by the law of nations
upon a belligerent engaged in a public war.
This, in our opinion, cannot be, because the law of nations and
vie Constitution of the United States are, in many respects, inconsistent with each other. Their co-existence and co-operation
are, therefore, in many respects impossible, and would produce
irreconcilable conflicts between different departments of the Gov.
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ernment. For instance, under the law of nations it is the right
and duty of the army to treat rebels taken in arms as prisoners
of war; but under the Constitution it is the right and duty of
the courts to treat them as traitors. We do not perceive how that
conflict can be avoided, except by holding that the Constitution
alone governs the relations between the parties to this contest ;
that it governs the army, as well as the President, the Congress,
and the courts, with reference to the conduct of the war; and
that it gives to the army, as an incident inseparable from the
power to prosecute the war, the same right to treat rebels taken
in arms as prisoners of war, which it gives to the courts, under
other circumstances, to treat them as traitors.
It has been said that, during a civl war, the sovereign may
exercise both belligerent and sovereign rights: Per MARSHALL,
C. J., in Rose vs. Himely, 4 Cranch 272; The Brilliant, etc., vs.
United States, supra. This cannot be doubted, but it does not
prove that the sovereign may treat those in rebellion both as alien
enemies and as rebellious subjects; nor is anything to that effect
contained in either of those cases. On the contrary, in the lastmentioned case it was declared that. all persons residing within
the Confederate States "whose property may be used to increase
the revenues of the hostile power, are, in this contest, liable to be
treated as enemies, though not foreigners."
Unquestionably the usage of nations, in the conduct of public
wars, may be considered for the purpose of ascertaining what are
the rules of civil war, and what is the meaning of those provisions
of the Constitution which authorize the Government to prosecute
such a war, just as the common law, though the Constitution does
not make it the law of the Government of the United States,
may be considered for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of
several provisions of the Constitution. And though the law of
nations does not govern the relations existing between the parties
to this war, it of course governs their several and mutual relations to other nations. It governs our intercourse with foreign
nations, as it has hitherto done, and must be considered by us, as
it is by them, in determining questions of blockade and of prize
VoL. XIL-31
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and other questions touching our foreign relations. Such wer
the questions involved in the cases of Me Brilliant,etc., vs. United
Ratme, supra.
In our opinion, the law of nations can have no other application

to this contest. But if we err in that opinion, it does not follow
that this Government can exercise all the powers conceded to
belligerents by that law. What we have stated, and the language
which we cited from Chief Justice MARSHALL'S opinion in the case
of Brown vs. United States, concerning the powers of a belligerent sovereign, relate to unlimited sovereignties. The law of
nations cannot convert a limited into an unlimited sovereignty.
It cannot be substituted for the Constitution of the United States
in war any more than in peace. The Constitution wcs designed
to be perpetual, and neither the President nor the Congress has
power to suspend it in war or in peace. Even if the law of nations
applies to this contest, it cannot confer upon the Government any
power, the exercise of which is prohibited by the Constitution, or
which is inconsistent with the nature of the Government established thereby. The law of nations concedes to a sovereign who
has closed a war by conquest, the right to establish any form of
government that he may choose over the conquered nation. Consistently with that law he may completely change their municipal
laws and political regulations; he may convert a free commonwealth into a dependent province, and govern it despotically.
Why may not similar powers be exercised by this Government
over the people of the Southern States? If it can deprive them
of their rights of property, in the manner proposed by the act
under consideration, why may it not, by a sweeping act of outlawry, deprive them of the right of suffrage and of all other of
their rights as citizens of the Union and of the states in which
they reside? If it may adopt any policy it pleases for the purpose, or the avowed purpose, of subduing them, why may it not
adopt any policy it may please for the purpose, or the avowed
purpose, of holding them in subjection after subduing them ?
Yet it seems clear that such powers cannot be lawfully exercised
over them if the rebellion should be subdued, because they are
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inconsistent with the nature of the Government, and the exercise
of them is prohibited by the Constitution, which declares that
"the United States shall guaranty to each state in this Union a
republican form of government," and which contains many other
provisions that are entirely incQmpatible with the exercise of the
powers in question.
If Congress had. the power to enact this statute, it can adopt
such measures as may be necessary to carry it into effect. Itis
probable that, in order to carry its provisions into effect, it will
be necessary not only to defeat and disperse -the rebel armies in
the field, but to subjugate the people of the rebellious states,
and to hold them in a condition of permanent subjection to the
Government of the Union, to be controlled by the people of the
other states. It seems certain that the framers of the Constitution
did not mean to clothe Congress with such power.
The facts, that the Constitution declares, that "treason against
the United States shall consist only in levying war against them,
or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort ;"
that it prescribes the mode of trying citizens charged with levying
war against the United States, and the place of trial, and that
it limits the punishment of them, proves that its framers did not
contemplate a suspension of its provisions by civil war, nor a
denial even to traitors of its guarantees, nor the exercise over them
of powers which it does not confer.
•The right of a sovereign to establish courts of prize in a conquered country is conceded by the law of nations. But it was
dbcided by the Supreme Court of the United States that, during
the war between the United States and Mexico, neither the President nor any inferior executive officer could establish a court of
prize in territory conquered from Mexico. The court said:"All captures jure belli are for the benefit of the sovereign
under whose authority they are made; and the validity of the
seizure and the question of prize or no prize can be determined
in his own courts only, upon which he has conferred jurisdiction
to try the question. And, under the Constitution of the United
States the judicial power of the General Government is vested
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in.one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress
shall from time to time establish. Every court of the United
States must therefore derive its jurisdiction and judicial authority
from the Constitution or laws of the United States ; and neither
the President nor any military officer can establish a court in a
conquered country, and authorize it to decide upon the rights of
the United States or of individuals, in prize cases, nor to administer the law of nations :" Juker vs. Montgomery, 1 Howard 515.
That case proves that the powers of each department of thu
Government of the' United States are limited by the Constitution,
even during a war with a foreign nation, and within its territory.
It is clear, therefore, that no department of the Government can
relieve itself from the restraints of the Constitution within the
territory of the United States, and in a war with its citizens.
It seems equally clear that the Constitution does not authorze
the confiscation of the property of a rebel, because of his-crime,
without a trial by jury of the offender, and his conviction "by
due process of law" (5th amendment), unless the power can be
derived from those provisions of the Constitution which authorize
the Government to suppress insurrections. Whether or not the
power can be thus derived depends upon the question whether or
not such confiscation is an act of war.
The right of the Government of the United States, during
either a public or civil war, to confiscate enemy's property takdn
upon the high. seas is not denied. This is an act which is made
lawful by the declaration or existence of war, and need not be
authorized by Congress. The seizure, in ;uch cases, is a purely
military act, and its sanction, by a judicial condemnation of the
property, does not deprive it of that character, but justifies it, as
such, to foreign nations, whose citizens may have an interest in
the property.
But the seizure and confiscation of enemy's property on land,
which is not contraband of war, are not acts of war. If they
were, they could be performed by the army, or be made lawful
by an order of the commander-in-chief, without other authority
than that conferred by the declaration or existence of war. It
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has been decided, however, by the Supreme Court of the United
States, that the declaration and existence of war between the
United States and Great Britain did not authorize the confiscation
of enemy's property- on land, and- that it could not be confiscated
except by virtue of an Act of Congress : Brown vs. United
States, supra. That decision proves that the seizure and confiscation of enemy's- property on land are not acts of war.
In that case it was conceded that, in a public war, such right
of confiscation belongs to Congress, as a belligerent right; and
we are not disposed to question the correctness of that concession.
But it does not follow that Congress has the same belligerent
right against rebellious citizens of the United States. The restrictions in the Constitution upon the powers of the Government
were designed to protect the people of the United States, and not
aliens resident abroad. The protection received by aliens residing abroad, with reference to their property here, is due to international comity, and not to the Constitution of the United States.
War may authorize the Government to refuse comity to its enemies, but cannot authorize it to suspend the Constitution, by virtue of which alone it has a right to exist. And, moreover, as has
been shown, the Constitution contains a provision authorizing Congress "-to make rules concerning captures on land and water"
during public wars, which does not apply to civil wars. In our
opinion, the existence of civil war does not confer upon this
Government any belligerent right whatever, except the right to
perform acts of war for the suppression of the rebellion. We
have shown, at any rate, that the law of nations concedes to
belligerents many powers which cannot be exercised by this Government, and that it cannot exercise any of those powers which
are in conflict with the Constitution.
Though the Constitution declares that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"
yet a rebel may lawfully be slain in battle, and thus be deprived
of life, or he may lawfully be captured in battle, and thus be deprived of liberty: because these, being acts of war, are authorized
by those other provisions of the Constitution which authorize.the
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prosecution of the war. But those provisions do not authorize the
confiscation of his property in the manner proposed by the statute
under considleration, because such confiscation is not an act of
war. Nor is such confiscation authorized by any other provision
of the Constitution. On the contrary, it is prohibited.
The 5th amendment, declaring that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation," prohibits the confiscation or forfeiture of the property
of any citizen of the United States, unless it can be sustained as
a purely military act, which, as has been shown, cannot be done
with reference to the property aimed at by the statute under consideration, or unless it can be sustained as a punishment for treason or other crime, the punishment of which Congress is authorized to prescribe.
The confiscation aimed at by the statute under consideration
cannot be sustained as a punishment for treason, because the statute undertakes to authorize the condemnation of the property by
a District Court, in any district in which any of the property may
be found, or into which, if movable, it may first be brought, without presentment or indictment by a grand jury, without the arrest
or summons of the owner, and upon such evidence of his guilt as
would be sufficient proof of any fact in admiralty or revenue cases ;
whilst the Constitution declares that " no person shall be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service
in time of war or public danger (5th amendment) ; that the trial
of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury,
and shall be held in the state where the said crime shall have been
committed (art. 3, sec. 2, sub. 3); and shall be by an impartial
jury of the state and district wherein the -said crime shall have
been committed, and that the accused shall enjoy the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him (6th amendment); and
that no person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in

NORRIS vs. DONIPHAN.

open court (art. 3, sec. 3, sub. 1). And these provisions, except
the last one, render it equally clear that this attempt at confiscation, or rather at forfeiture, cannot be sustained as a punishment
for any crime less than treason.
If, therefore, the act should bye regarded, as we believe it must
be, as an attempt to punish citizens for treason, or for aiding or
abetting the rebellion, it is unconstitutional and void, because it
authorizes a trial of those crimes in a mode different from that
required by the Constitution.
If it should be regarded as an attempt, not to punish those
citizens for crime, but to support the army of the United States
with the proceeds of their property, it is unconstitutional and
void-, because it makes no provision for compensation. The Constitution does not recognise military necessity nor any other necessity whatever, as an authority for "taking private property
for public use," in peace or in war, without just compensation.
Whether or not the provisions of the act concerning the confiscation of personal property are in conflict with that clause of
the Constitution which declares that "no attainder of treason
shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the
life of the person attainted," is a question upon which a majority
of the court deem it unnecessary to express an opinion. Upon
this point Judge WILLIAmS dissents, and proposes to write his own
separate opinion.
3. It remains to be determined whether or not, upon common
law principles, the appellee can, during the war, maintain an action
for the money claimed in her petition.
This question is entirely distinct from that relating to the right
of confiscation, and depends, as we have just intimated, not upon
the Constitution nor upon the law of nations, but upon the common
law. The fact that the Government is not authorized by the Constitution to confiscate the debt, does not prove that the appellee is
entitled, by the common law, to recover the money during the
war, and take it to Arkansas, where it may be used against the
Government.
By the common law, though war does not create a forfeiture of
the rights of alien enemies, growing out of pre-existing contracts,
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it is settled that the right of action of an alien enemy, residing
in the enemy's country, is suspended by war during its contmiuanco.
It is from reasons of national policy that the alien is prevented
from recovering the money and carrying it out of the country during the war: Levine vs. Taylor, 11 Mass. R. 12; Bussell vs.
Skipwith, 6 Binney 249.
As we have remarked, this insurrection has taken the shape of
war. Those engaged in it have established a de facto government,
complete in all its parts, and exercising sovereign powers over an
extensive territory. "It is no loose, unorganized insurrection,
having no defined boundary or possession. It has a boundary
marked by lines of bayonets, and which can be crossed only by
force. South of this line is enemy's territory, because it is claimed
and held in possession by an organized, hostile, and belligerent
power. All persons residing within this territory, whose property
may be used to increase the revenues of the hostile power, are in
this contest liable to be treated as enemies, though not foreigners:"
The Brilliant,Io., vs. United States.
Whether or not merely residing in that territory would render
a person liable to be treated as an enemy, is a question upon
which we need not express an opinion.
We are satisfied that, if the statements of the answer are true,
those principles of the common law which suspend an alien enemy's
right of action during war, apply to this case, and forbid our
courts from aiding the appellee to recover money which might be
used by her to support the wicked and causeless rebellion against
the United States.
The Code of Practice does not authorize a plea in abatement.
But one of the grounds of defence that may be presented in the
answer is, " that the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue." If
the facts stated in the answer are true, the petition should be dismissed without prejudice.
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Supreme Court of Michigan.
THE NIAGARA FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY V8. HENRY DE GRAFF.
Liquors, the sale of which is prohibited under a penalty, may still be insured.
Goods were insured under the designation of "groceries.'" As matter of fact, the
stock included a small quantity of spirituous. liquors kept for sale. A loss
occurred, and an action: being brought on the policy, the insured asked the
court to charge the jury that, since the Prohibitory Liquor Law, the term
"groceries," as used in referring to goods kept for sale, would not include
liquors. Held, that- the request was too broad, and that the question whether
the liquors were insured under this term was properly left to the jury as one
of fact.
A policy of insurance on "groceries" had annexed thereto a condition that if the
premises were used for storing or keeping therein certain hazardous articles,
among which-were enumerated alcohol and spirituous liquors, "except as herein
specially provided for, or hereafter agreed to by this corporation. in writing
upon this policy," the policy should thereby be rendered of no effect. Alcohol
and spirituous liquors were kept as a part of the stock, and it was held that if
the jury found that the term "groceries," as used, included these articles, then,
by the use of a term including them, they were "specially provided for in
writing on, the policy."
A verdict will not be set aside for inconsistent charges to the jury, it all those
excepted to by the complaining party are correct.

C. A. Stacy and C. J. Walker, for plaintiffs in error.
A. L. Millerd and T. X. Cooley, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-Plaintiffs in error insured De Graff upon his
stock of goods, described in his application as a "stock of dry
goods, groceries, &c.," dividing the risk into specific sums on
dry goods, groceries, hardware, and other things specifically mentioned. There was evidence tending to show that he had in his
store a few bottles of spirituous liquors and a barrel of alcohol.
Alcohol was among the articles mentioned in the second class of
hazards in the second subdivision of extra hazards. Grocers'
stocks generally were in the first subdivision of the same class.
I We are

indebted for this case to the kindness of Mr. Cooley, the Reporter
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Bottled spirituous liquors were not classed as extra hazardous, but
were included in the first class of ordinary hazards in the second
division of hazardous. There was evidence tending to show that
the insurance agent who drew up the application was informed of
the presence of the liquors and alcohol, which was, however, denied
by the agent. The property being destroyed, a suit was brought
on the policy, and judgment was recovered. Error is brought on
the rulings upon the trial.
The points taken refer mostly to a clause in the policy which
declared that if the store should be used " for storing or keeping
therein any articles, goods, or merchandise denominated hazardous,
or extra hazardous, or specially hazardous in the second class
of the classes of hazards annexed to this policy, except as herein
specially provided for, or hereafter agreed to by this corporation,
in writing upon this policy, from thenceforth so long as, the same
shall be so used, this policy shall be of no force or effect." There
vyas a further clause annulling the policy whenever gunpowder or
any other article subject to legal restriction should be kept in.
greater quantities or in a different manner than prescribed by
law.
The court below refused to charge as requested, that, since the
passage of the Prohibitory Liquor Law, alcohol and spirituous
liquors are not included in the term " groceries," as used in referring to goods kept for sale; and charged that the question whether
they were so included was one of fact for the jury. To this, exception is taken.
It was claimed on behalf of the plaintiff in error, that if these
liquors can be allowed to be included in a policy, the policy will
be, to all intents and purposes, insuring an illegal traffic; and
several cases were cited involving marine*policies on unlawful voyages and lottery insurances, which have been held void on that
ground. These cases are not at all parallel, because they rest
upon the fact that, in each instance, it is made a necessary condi.
tion of the policy that the illegal act shall be done. The ship
being insured for a certain voyage, that voyage is the only one
upon which the insurance would apply, and the underwriter be-
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comes thus directly a party to an illegal act. So, insuring a lottery ticket requires the 'lottery to be drawn in order to attach the
insurance to the risk. If this policy were in express terms a
policy insuring the party selling liquors against loss by fine or
But this insurance
forfeiture, it would be quite analogous.
attaches only to property, and the risks insured against are not
the consequences of illegal acts, but of accident. Our statute
does not in any way destroy or affect the right of property in
spirituous liquors, or prevent title being transmitted, but renders
sales unprofitable by preventing the vendor from availing himself
of the ordinary advantages of a sale, and also affixes certain
penalties : Hibbard vs. People, 4 Mich. 125 ; .Bagg vs. J-crome, 7
Id. 145. If the owner sees fit to retain his property without
selling it, or to transmit it into another state or country, he can
do so. By insuring his property, the insurance company has
no concern with the use he may make of it, and as it is susceptible of lawful uses, no one can be held to contract concerning it
in an illegal manner, unless the contract itself is for a distinctly
illegal purpose. Collateral contracts, in which no illegal design
enters, are not affected by an illegal transaction with which they
may be remotely connected. 'In the case of The Ocean n8. Co.
vs. Palley8, 13 Peters 157, an insurance upon a ship known by
the insurance company to be liable to forfeiture under the registry
laws of the United States, was held valid, and a recovery was
permitted for a loss while sailing under papers known to be illegal.
The case of Arm8trong vs. Toler, 11 Wheaton 258, is still stronger.
It is difficult to perceive how public policy can be violated by an
insurance of any kind of property recognised to exist.
The question arises whether the court rightly left it to the jury
to say, as a matter of fact, whether the term -groceries" included
spirituous liquors and alcohol. That it may include them in the
absence of such a statute is not denied, the recognised definitions
embracing them clearly, so that it may be doubted whether it might
not, in that case, require evidence of usage to exclude that meaning, if such articles existed in an insured stock of groceries. See
lew
zYork Equitable Insurance Company vs. Langdon, 6 Wend.
623. There was evidence before the jury, in the case bef6re us,
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that these things did, in fact, form a part of the stock, and evidence tending to show a knowledge of that fact by the agent.
The statute does not prohibit the sale of all kinds of liquors, but,
as to some, carefully recognises the right in every one. Whatever may be the presumption under our present statute as to the
extent of the term c,groceries"-a question not raised in the case,
and upon which, therefore, it would be improper to pass-we
think the instruction asked was altogether too broad, in claiming
that alcohol and other liquors could not possibly be included. The
0
question was properly left to the jury.
If the jury found (as this verdict shows they must have done)
that the term "groceries" included the liquors in question, then
the other instructions complained of, which held that, by insuring
such a stock, the liquors were embraced, although extra hazardous, were clearly correct. By the use of a term including them,
they are "zspecially providedfor in writing on the policy." Insuring a class of goods includes what is usually contained in it, whether extra hazardous or not. See Bryant vs. Poughkceepaie.utual
Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 200; Harpervs. Albany Mutual Ins. Co., 17
Id. 194; Earper vs. N. Y. Cty Ins. Co., 22 Id. 441 ; Delonguemere vs. The Tradesmen's Ins. Co., 2 Hall 589. In these instructions, the jury were directed to include the articles only if satisfied that they were commonly kept and sold as part of a grocer's
stock. This qualification was sufficiently broad to prevent any
improper influences.
Our attention has been called to the fact that the other charges
given on the one side and refused on the other, are inconsistent
with those complained of. So far as this is the case, however, they
favored the plaintiffs in error, those excepted to being the only
ones which could damnify them. Had the verdict been for them,
the discrepancies would have been more important in determining
the rights of the other party. The question whether the jury did
not find against evidence, or perversely, could only be presented
in the Circuit Court.
The judgment below must be affirmed.
MANNING and CHRISTIANOY, JJ., concurred.
MARTIN, C. J., was absent.
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A statut e authorizing a party who has paid usurious interest for the loan of
money, to sue for the recovery of the excess within one year from such payment,
is cumulative, and does not take away the right of the borrower to recover such
excess in an action at common law.
A provision in such statute, that if the party paying usury shall not bring his
action within one year, another person (such as a superintendent of the poor)
may then sue for and recover the amount paid for usury within three years
after such first year, does not absolutely suspend the right of action of the party
paying the usury, but he may still sue at any time before suit actually brought
hy such public officer.
DI-tum of SPENcER, C. J., in Wheaton vs. Ri6bard, 20 Johns. 290, overruled.
A married woman having, under the laws of New York, power to make and enforce contracts in relation to the loan of money belonging to her separate estate,
is therefore liable in an action for taking usurious interest, in the same manner
as other usurers, and judgment may be given against her separate estate as if
she were sole.

R. L. .Dorr,for plaintiff.
Bemis and Stevens, for defendants.
The facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by
JAMES

C. SMITH, J.-This is an action to recover money alleged

to have been received by the defendants as excessive and unlawful
interest for the loan and forbearance of money. The first question
presented is whether the action is barred by the special statutory
limitation existing in this state in respect to certain actions of this
nature. The plaintiff is undoubtedly correct in his position that
the statute (1 R. S. 772, § 3, Act of 1787, 1 R. L. 64) which
authorizes the party paying usurious interest for the loan and forbearance of money to sue for and recover the excess within one
year next after such payment, is cumulative, and does not take
away the common law remedy of the borrower, to recover such
excess in an action for that purpose. It was so held by the Supreme Court in Wheaton vs. Hibbard, 20 Johns. 290, under the
Act of 1787, which was substantially the same as our present
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statute in respect to this question: Schroeppel vs. Coming,2 Selden
107, per PAIaE, J., 115, and FooT, J., 118. But our statute,,
which was taken from that of 12 Anne, ch. 16, contains a further
provision which was not in the English statute, that if the person
paying usury shall not bring his suit within the year, and prosecute it to effect, then the excess so paid may be sued-for and recovered, with costs, at any time within three years after the said
one year, by any overseer of the town or by any superintendent
of the poor of the county in which the payment may have been
made (§ 4). The Statute of 1787 contained a similar provision,
allowing any other person to prosecute within one year next after
the year allowed to the borrower; and in view of that provision,
Justice SPErNCER, delivering the opinion of the court in Wheaton
vs. Hibbard,-supra,said: "The injured party cannot have both
remedies, and if he neglects to pursue the statute remedy for
more than a year, his right of action at common law would be
guendei during the second year, for, peradventure, a third person may prosecute." If this construction is correct, it follows that
on the 24th day of March 1862, when this suit was commenced,
the plaintiff's right of action in respect to the interest paid on the
1st day of April 1858 and the 5th of November 1859, was suspended by the provision of our present statute, which gives a right
of action to the public officers named, during three years next
after the one year. However, his right of action was *infull force
in respect to the payment made on the 15th of April 1857, because
as to that the three years had expired, and the public officers had
not sued, so that in any view of the case the Statute of Limitation
was not a bar to the whole cause of action. But as the question
in respect to the effect of the statute upon his right of action for
the other payments will arise again, upon a new trial, it is proper
that it should now be considered.
The remark of Judge SPENCER above referred to is obiter dicturn; no authority is cited in its support, and with due respect for
the opinion of the learned judge from whom it fell, I am inclined
to think it is not wholly correct. If the borrower's right of
action is suspended during the three years, either the statute con-
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tinues to run in the mean time, and thus the period within which
the borrower may sue is practically reduced from six years to
three, or else the running of the statute is suspended with the
cause of action, and thus the time in which the borrower may sue
is extended from six years to nine. I think a better rule of construction is stated by Lord CORE, in .Foster'sCase, 11 Rep. 64.
thus: " In all acts which are introductive of a new law, tile express designation of one person is the exclusion of all others. * *
But in many cases the designation of a new person in a later Act
of Parliament shall not exclude another person who was authorized
to do the same thing by a precedent act." ' And he gives the following illustration of his meaning: "It is enacted by the Statute
of 8 Henry 6, ch. 16, that after office found, &c., he who finds himself grieved may within the month offer a traverse, and to take
the lands and tenements to farm, and that then the chancellor.
treasurer, and other officers shall let them to him to farm until, &c.
And now, by the Statute 1 H. 8, 16, he has liberty by the space
of three months; and afterwards the Statute of 32 H. 8, 40, gave
authority to the master of the wards, with the advice of one of the
council, to make a lease of the lands of a ward or of an idiot during the time they shall remain in the king's hands. Although the
latter act designs another person, yet it doth not utterly take
away the first; for if before any lease made by the master of
the wards, the chancellor and treasurer make one according to the
Statute of 8 H. 6, then the said master cannot demise it; and so if
the master makes it first to another, the chancellor and treasurercannot demise to the party grieved." The rule laid down by Lord
COKE is applicable to the case in hand, as it is manifestly immaterial whether the first authority is given by a precedent statute or
by the common law, if there are no negative words or words of
exclusion in the later act. The two are to stand together as far
as possible. I think, therefore, the borrower's common-law righ't
of action is not absolutely suspended during the three years given
to the public officers by the statute, but he may sue during that
period, provided neither of such officers has previously sued for
the same matter, and not otherwise. In this case it is not alleged

PORTER vs. MOUNT.

or proved that the officers have sued, and if the fact were so,
it should have been shown affirmatively by the defendants. If
these views are correct, the statute in question is not a bar to the
plaintiffs action in respect to either sum paid by him.The remaining question to be considered is whether the evidence.
in any view that may properly be made of it, establishes a cause
of action against the defendants. At the time of the loan and
the payment of the several sums of money sought to be recovered,
the defendants were husband and wife. Upon the argument
before us, and also upon the trial, as I infer from the printed
case, it was taken for granted that the wife had a separate legal
estate, under the provisions of the Statute of 1848 and 1849, for
the more effectual protection of married women; and the evidence
tends to show, and if submitted to the jury would have authorized them to find, that the money loaned and the security taken
therefor belonged exclusively to the wife as a part of her legal
estate,'and that the money taken for the forbearance was taken
and received by her, and that her husband, so far as he participated in the transaction, acted for her and with her knowledge
and assent. In this view of the case, I am of the opinieu that the
action may be maintained. There can be no doubt but under the.
provisions of the statute referred to, a married woman having a
separate legal estate consisting of money, may lead the same,
take and hold securities therefor in her own name, and sue for
and'enforce them at law. The power to do these things includes
the ability to make all contracts incident thereto. See Barton vs.
Beer, 35 Barbour 78. As her common law disabilities are removed to this extent, and she may enforce at law contracts in
relation to the loan and forbearance of money to which she is a
party, and enjoy the benefits and profits accruing from them, it
would be intolerable to hold that she is exempt from the liabilities
which the law imposes upon all other lenders of" money. The
basis of this action is an obligation on the part of the lender to
refund the excess which the law implies from the nature of the
transaction. The statutes referred to permit married women to
engage in the business of lending money, but not to take usury.

